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JURISDICTION STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to U.C.A. 
§78-2a-3(2)(e), inasmuch as it is an appeal from a court of record in a criminal case, not 
involving a first degree or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Was tlie State obligated under U.C.A. §77-32-302 to provide the Defendant 
with an accountant to assist in his defense at State expense? Questions of statutory 
interpretation are subject to a correction of error standard, according no particular 
deference to tlie tiial court. State v. Burns. 4 P.3d 795, 798, 2000 UT 56. Record 101. 
2. Did tlie tiial court abuse its discretion under U.C.A. §77-8a-l by refusing to 
sever the trials of tlie two charges? An appellate "will reverse a conviction only if the trial 
judge's refusal to sever charges is a clear abuse of discretion in that it sacrifices tlie 
defendant's right to a fundamentally fair trial." State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 42 (Utah 
App. 1990). Record 184-188. 
3. Was the Defendant denied a fair trial due to manifest bias on the part of the trial 
judge? Defendant did not specifically move to disqualify the trial judge under Rule 29(c) 
of tlie Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, nor otherwise specifically object to the judges 
behavior, but objects on the basis of plain error. "To establish plain error, a defendant 
must demonstrate that c(i) an eiror exists; (ii) the eiror should have been obvious to the 
tiial court; and (iii) the is harmful, i.e., absent the eiror, there is a reasonable likelihood of 
a more favorable outcome for tlie defendant, or pin ased differently, our confidence in the 
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verdict is undermined." State v. Beck, 136 P.3d 1288, 1291, 2006 UT App 177. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
U.C.A. §76-7-201 
(1) A person commits criminal nonsupport if, having a spouse, a 
child, or children under the age of 18 years, he knowingly fails to provide 
for the support of the spouse, cliild, or children when any one of them: 
(a) is in needy circumstances; or 
(b) would be in needy circumstances but for support received 
from a source other than the defendant or paid on the defendant's 
behalf. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), criminal nonsupport is a 
class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Criminal nonsupport is a felony of the third degree if the actor: 
(c) commits the crime of nonsupport in each of 18 individual 
months within any 24-month period, or the total airearage is in 
excess of $10,000. 
(5) (a) In a prosecution for criminal nonsupport under this 
section, it is an affirmative defense that the accused is unable to 
provide support. Voluntary unemployment or underemployment by 
the defendant does not give rise to that defense. 
(b) Not less than 20 days before trial the defendant shall file 
and serve on the prosecuting attorney a notice, in writing, of his 
intention to claim the affirmative defense of inability to provide 
support. The notice shall specifically identity the factual basis for the 
defense and the names and addresses of the witnesses who the 
defendant proposes to examine in order to establish the defense. 
(c) Not more than ten days after receipt of the notice 
described in Subsection (5)(b), or at such other time as the court may 
direct, the prosecuting attorney shall file and serve the defendant 
with a notice containing the names and addresses of the witnesses 
who the state proposes to examine in order to contradict or rebut the 
defendant's claim. 
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U.C.A. §77-8a-l(4)(a) (Quoted in brief) 
U.C.A. §77-32-302 (Quoted in brief) 
U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(e) (Quoted in brief) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On July 29, 2004, the State filed an Information charging Tren Horrocks with two 
counts of Criminal nonsupport under U.C.A. §76-7-201. Both counts were charged as 
Third Degree felonies under Subsection (3)(c). On March 7, 2006, Mr. Horrocks filed a 
motion requesting the State to provide funds so that he could hire an accountant to assist 
in his defense. This motion was denied by the trial court on March 31, 2006. See Adden-
dum A. On April 27, 2006, Mr. Horrocks moved to sever the charges on the two separate 
counts. This motion was denied on May 23, 2006. See Addendum B. On May 9, 2006, 
Mr. Horrocks filed notice under U.C.A. §76-7-20 l(5)(b) of his intent to claim the affir-
mative defense of inability to pay. Trial was held on June 5 and 6, 2006. The jury was 
instructed as to both felony and the lesser included offense of misdemeanor criminal 
nonsupport. The jury returned guilty verdicts of felonies on both counts. On August 22, 
2006, Mr. Horrocks was sentenced to 10 years probation, ordered to serve 120 days in the 
Uintah County Jail, and ordered to pay $457 per month toward ongoing child support and 
$543 per month toward an arrearage of $53,017.40. This appeal was filed the same day. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mr. Horrocks divorced Teresa Ann Warden on or about May 22, 1990. He and 
Ms. Warden had two children: Jillyn Eugenia Horrocks, born May 4, 1987, and Kelsey 
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Maureen Horroeks, bom September 23, 1988. 
2. Pursuant to the divorce decree, Mr. Hoiroeks was ordered to pay child support. 
The amount of child support ordered was subsequently altered to reflect changes in 
circumstances. 
3. The State of Utah alleged in Count I that Mr. Horroeks committed the offense of 
criminal non-support by knowingly failing to provide child support to Ms. Warden on 
behalf of JiUyn and Kelsey in each of eighteen months witliin a twenty-four month period 
or owed a total arrearage in excess of $10,000 during the period between August 1, 1997, 
and July 12, 2004. 
4. After Mr. Hoiroeks divorced from Ms. Warden, he married Maria Louise 
Pincock. They divorced September 27, 1994, subsequently remarried, and divorced again 
on May 11, 1998. Two children were bom to this marriage: Ashley Louise Horroeks, 
bom July 10, 1991, and deceased July 6, 2000, and Allie Brianne Hoiroeks, bom January 
12, 1996. 
5. Pursuant to the divorce decree, Mr. Horroeks was ordered to pay child support. 
The amount of child support ordered was subsequently altered to reflect changes in 
circumstances. 
6. The State of Utah alleged in Count II that Mr. Horroeks committed the offense 
of criminal non-support by knowingly failing to provide child support to Ms. Pincoek on 
behalf of Ashley and Allie in each of eigliteen months within a twenty-four month period 
or owed a total arrearage in excess of $10,000 during the period between October 1, 
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1998, and June 1, 2004. 
7. During a part of the period for which the State alleged an arrearage, Jillyn and 
Kelsey lived with Mr. Horrocks. Ms. Warden paid no child support during this time. 
8. In September, 1994, Mr. Horrocks was injured in an industrial accident and 
burned over 60% of his body. 
9. Is is Mr. Horrocks' position that he was unable to pay child support due to his 
reduced earning ability in consequence of his injuries. 
10. The evidence demonstrated that there were discrepancies between the State's 
accounting and Mr. Horrocks' calculation of amounts owed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. By the same token that Mr. Horrocks qualified for the appointment of counsel, 
he also qualified for the hiring of an expert witness at the State's expense. The trial court 
applied inappropriate criteria in denying Mr. Horrocks' request for funds to hire and 
expert witness. 
2. Trials on separate charges should be severed when the evidence on one charge 
would tend to prejudice the jury on the other, and the evidence on the separate charges 
would not otherwise be admissable in the separate trials. Mr. Horrocks was prejudiced 
when the trial court denied his motion to sever. 
3. The trial judge displayed a consistent bias against Mr. Horrocks, causing him to 
deny numerous valid motions as if Mr. Horrocks' conviction was already a foregone 
conclusion. This bias is manifest from the record, and thus constitutes plain error. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. As an indigent defendant, Mr. Horrocks was denied adequate resources to prepare 
his defense. 
The bulk of the State's evidence against Mr. Horrocks consisted of account 
statements compiled by the Office of Recovery Services. The accuracy of those accounts 
was thus a critical element in the State's case. In particular, the State alleged that an 
arrearage already existed at the beginning of the period for which Mr. Horrocks was 
being charged, while Mr. Horrocks maintained that the accounts should have shown a 
surplus. 
U.C.A. §77-32-302(1) states: 
Legal counsel shall be assigned to represent each indigent and the 
indigent shall also be provided with access to defense resources necessary 
for an effective defense, if the indigent is under arrest for or charged with a 
crime in wrhich there is a substantial probability that the penalty to be 
imposed is confinement in either jail or prison if: 
(a) the indigent requests counsel or defense resources, or both; or 
(b) the court on its own motion or otherwise orders counsel, defense 
resources, or both and the defendant does not affirmatively waive or reject 
on the record the opportunity to be represented and provided defense 
resources. 
Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states in pertinent part: 
Upon showing that a defendant is financially unable to pay the fees 
of an expert whose services are necessary for adequate defense, the witness 
fee shall be paid as if he were called on behalf of the prosecution. 
"It follows, therefore, that the only requirements for receiving public assistance for 
expert witnesses are proof of necessity and establishment of indigence." State v. Bums. 4 
P.3d 795, 801, 2000 UT 56. There is no question that accounting records were an essen-
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tial element in the State's case, and there is no question that Mr. Horrocks was indigent. 
However, the trial judge wrent a step further and made his own determination as to the 
validity of the State's accounts, deciding, without the assistance of an accountant, that the 
statements were valid, and effectively preventing Mr. Horrocks from challenging the 
accounts at all. Denial of an expert to an indigent defendant is sufficient grounds to 
reverse a conviction if "the error is substantial and prejudicial in the sense that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that in its absence there would have been a more favorable result 
for the defendant." State v. Bums. 4 P.3d at 802. In this case, a rigorous examination of 
the State's accounts could have meant the difference between a felony and a 
misdemeanor. A sufficient discrepancy in the accounts might have undermined the State's 
credibility entirely. Mr. Horrocks was denied this resource for his defense when the trial 
judge took upon himself the role of accountant. He was thus prejudiced, and the 
convictions should be reversed. 
n. Mr. Horrocks was prejudiced by being prosecuted for two unrelated offences in 
one trial. 
U.C.A. §77-8a-l states in pertinent part: 
(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be charged in 
the same indictment or information if each offense is a separate count and if 
the offenses charged are: 
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected 
together in their commission; or 
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan. 
(4)(a) If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced 
by a joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by 
a joinder for trial together, the court shall order an election of separate trials 
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of separate counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide other relief 
as justice requires. 
Subsections (1) and (2) require a two-part analysis. The court must determine, 
first, whether the counts were connected together in their commission or were alleged to 
be part of a common scheme or plan, and second, even if the counts are so connected, 
whether the defendant would be prejudiced by trying them together. State v. Scales. 946 
P.2d 377, 385 (Utah App. 1997). 
The trial court applied a flawed analysis to the first part, and completely failed to 
consider the factors governing prejudice. The sole connection the State alleged between 
the two counts was that Mr. Horrocks committed the same offense with regard to two 
different victims, and that he committed the offenses during overlapping time periods. No 
other connection between the two counts was alleged. The State also argued that the 
counts constituted part of a common scheme or plan, but offered no evidence of any 
scheme or plan, other than to repeat the similarity of the offenses and their proximity in 
time. In fact, Mr. Horrocks was merely charged with crimes of omission. A common 
scheme or plan is in itself an act of commission. The trial court abused its discretion in 
finding a sufficient link to justify a single trial. 
Subsection (4)(a) leaves no room for discretion. If the court finds that a defendant 
wrould be prejudiced by a single trial "the court shall order an election of separate trials." 
(Emphasis added). "The initial inquiry regarding whether a defendant is prejudiced by 
joinder is whether evidence of the other crime would have been admissable in a separate 
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trial." State v.Meade. 27 P.3d 1115, 1130 (Utah 2001). Very simply, it could not. There 
is no aspect of Count I that the State could have introduced in a trial of Count II, and 
there is no evidence of Count II that the State could have introduced in a trial of Count I. 
The debt allegedly owed to Ms. Warden had nothing to do with the debt allegedly owed 
to Ms. Pincock, and vice versa. Proximity in time or nature of the offenses was not an 
element supporting either count, and thus could serve no other purpose than to prejudice 
the trial in favor of the prosecution. 
The State apparently attempted to avoid this obvious disparity by confusing 
identical witnesses with identical evidence. While the same witness might have testified 
as to the State's accounting in both trials, that witness certainly could not have testified 
about Ms. Pincock's account in the trial regarding Ms. Warden's account, and vice versa. 
Certainly neither Ms. Warden nor Ms. Pincock themselves could have testified as to the 
other ex-wife's account. Nor did the State ever identify what identical evidence it 
intended to introduce in two separate trials. It is clear that it could not. 
In short, even if the trial court did not abuse its discretion under U.C.A. §77-8a-l, 
Subsection (1), it nevertheless entirely failed to apply the appropriate mandatory criteria 
under Subsection (4)(a). "[E]rror is substantial and prejudicial in the sense that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that in its absence there would been a more favorable result for the 
defendant." State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 361 (Utah 1993), or, in other words, "our 
confidence in the verdict is undermined." State v. Casey, 82 P.3d 1106, 2003 UT 55, fU. 
By trying both counts together, each count was reinforced by evidence that would have 
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been entirely inadmissable in separate trials, and thus was purely inflammatory for the 
purpose of the trial at hand. Mr. Horrocks was prejudiced by a joint trial, and the 
convictions should therefore be reversed. 
III. Mr. Horrocks was prejudiced by bias on the part of the trial judge. 
In the course of the proceedings, it became apparent that the trial judge had a bias 
against Mr. Horrocks. Normally, a party alleging bias must make a motion to disqualify 
under Rule 29(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure within 20 days of discovering 
the bias. However, when this bias becomes apparent through a cumulative series of 
slanted rulings, it is often difficult to say with precision exactly when the bias became 
apparent, thus rendering it difficult to comply with the strict requirements of Rule 29(c). 
Nevertheless, bias on the part of a trial judge sufficient to prejudice the proceedings is 
readily susceptible to a plain error analysis. 
"To establish plain error, a defendant must demonstrate that '(i) an error exists; (ii) 
the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the is harmful, i.e., absent 
the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the defendant, 
or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined." State v. Beck. 136 
P.3d 1288, 1291, 2006 UT App 177. 
The pattern of bias emerges not only from the two pretrial Rulings, Record 101, 
184-188, but from the conduct of the trial. Record 425, pp. 5-12, 34-37, 39-41, 182-183, 
213, 219, 262-263, and 272-285, and Record 426, pp. 389, 449 and 453. It appears that a 
predisposition in favor of the prosecution tainted all of the proceedings and effectively 
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prevented Mr. Horrocks from obtaining the defense resources he needed, as well as from 
presenting his full theory of defense in a non-cumulative forum. 
CONCLUSION 
Without an accountant, Mr. Horrocks was denied the opportunity to adequately 
defend himself. He was also prejudiced by having both counts tried together, and by bias 
on the part of the trial judge. His convictions should therefore be reversed. 
DATED this 21st day of May, 2007. 
Michael L. Humiston 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellants were 
mailed to the following this 21st day of May, 2007: 
Utah Attorney General 
Appellate Division 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Michael L. Humiston 
ADDENDUM A 
/ 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : RULING 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
TREN SHELDON HORROCKS, : Case No.: 041800326 
Defendant. : 
The Defendant's Request to Appoint an Accountant is denied. The request does not 
demonstrate how an accountant would assist the Defendant in his defense. The records of the 
State appear to be kept on a computer with no back-up documents to review for accuracy other 
than the Defendant's own records. The State has agreed to give the Defendant credit for any 
payments he has made when he has proof of payment. This record keeping does not require the 
skills of an accountant. 
DATED this $0 day of March, 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
A. LYNN PAYNff DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the -J/ y day of March, 2006, true and correct copies of the 
Ruling were mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered to: Ms Ann Rozycki, Assistant Attorney 
General, at P.O. Box 140814, Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0814 and to Mr. Bryan Sidwell, 
Attorney for Defendant, at 134 W. Main, Suite 202, Vernal, UT 84078. 
-UJAJL/ 
Deputy Clerl 
ADDENDUM B 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TREN SHELDON HORROCKS, 
Defendant. 
RULING 
CASE NO. 
JUDGE A. 
041800326 
LYNN PAYNE 
This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's "Motion 
to Sever Charges," filed with the Court on April 27, 2006, and 
accompanied by supporting memorandum. The State's response to 
the Defendant's motion was filed on May 02, 2006. The Court, 
having reviewed the motion, now enters the following ruling on 
the motion. 
This case involves two third-degree felony charges against 
the Defendant for failure to support his children from two sepa-
rate marriages. "A court should sever charges when it concludes 
that prejudice to the defendant outweighs considerations of 
economy and practicalities of judicial administration, with 
doubts being resolved in favor of severance." State v. Smith, 
927 P.2d 649, 653 (Utah App. 1996). 
Count One alleges that the Defendant knowingly failed to 
support his children, Jillyn and Kelsey, from August 1997 
through July 2004. Count Two alleges that the Defendant know-
ingly failed to support his children, Ashley and Allie, from Oc-
tober 1998 through July 2004. The two sets of the Defendant's 
children result from different marriages. The Defendant has 
filed a motion to sever the charges, arguing that in the present 
case the two counts are not connected in that there are separate 
victims from each alleged count. The Defendant also argues that 
there is no common scheme between the alleged counts. The State 
argues that "since these charges cover approximately the same 
time periods, it is the State's position that Defendant commit-
ted both criminal counts with the common scheme or plan to pay 
little or no child support for any of his children." State's 
Response, pg.3. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l (2006) governs this this area of 
law. State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 60 n.8 (Utah 1993). The 
relevant section of the Utah Code states: 
Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be charged 
in the same indictment or information if each offense is a 
separate count and if the offenses charged are: (a) based 
on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in 
their commission; or (b) alleged to have been part of a 
common scheme or plan. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(l) (2006). In this case, each of the 
offenses brought against the Defendant are separate counts, al-
leged to be part of a common scheme or plan (to avoid paying 
child support for his children). In State v. Lee, 831 P.2d 114 
(Utah App. 1992), the Utah Court of Appeals addressed what was 
required in order to establish a "common scheme or plan" under 
this statute. 
The Lee court first identified that Utah appellate courts 
had not yet interpreted that language under this statute. Lee, 
831 P,2d at 117. Rather, the Utah appellate courts have looked 
to neighboring states for their interpretations. The Arizona 
Supreme Court, in interpreting a rule similar to section 77-8a-
1, held that: "in order for two crimes to be classified as a 
common plan or scheme it is not necessary for the crimes to have 
been perpetrated in an absolutely identical manner, so long as 
the court perceives a visual connection between the two crimes." 
State v. Tipton, 119 Ariz. 386, 581 P.2d 231 (Ariz. 1978). The 
Lee court also cited cases from Idaho and Missouri, both of 
which allowed joinder of two or more claims where both counts in 
the indictment referred to the same type of offense, even where 
the time periods for commission of the separate offenses were 
months apart. See State v. Warren, 717 S.W.2d 231 (Mo. App. 
1986); see also State v. Schwartzmiller, 685 P.2d 830 (Idaho 
1984). In Lee, the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the trial 
court's conclusion that the alleged crimes were part of a ''com-
mon scheme or plan.'7 The Lee court stated, "The parallel fact 
pattern in both incidents plainly demonstrates the existence of 
a calculated plan. 
Later, in State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377 (Utah App. 1997), 
the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision to 
deny a defendant's motion to sever charges. The defendant had 
been charged with murder and theft. The Scales court stated 
that "to determine whether the trial court complied with section 
77-8a-l, we must interpret it according to the common meaning of 
its plain language." Scales, 946 P.2d at 384-85. The court 
then indicated that "the language of section 77-8a-l is clear." 
Id. The Scales court was convinced that the murder and theft 
charges were part of a common scheme or plan, the thefts facili-
tating flight from the murder scene. 
Therefore, under the plain language of the statute and sup-
porting case law, the statutory requirements for joinder of the 
charges appear to have been met. However, the same statute con-
tinues by stating: 
If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is preju-
diced by a joinder of offenses or defendants in an indict-
ment or information or by a joinder for trial together, the 
court shall order an election of separate trials of sepa-
rate counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide 
other relief as justice requires. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l (4) (a) (2006). This section requires 
the Court to determine whether the parties (either the State or 
the Defendant) would be prejudiced by joinder of the offenses, 
and if prejudice results, the court is to take appropriate ac-
tion. "The initial inquiry regarding whether a defendant is 
prejudiced by joinder is whether evidence of the other crime 
would have been admissible m a separate trial." State v. Mead, 
2001 UT 58, 1159 (internal quotations omitted) . In Lee, the Utah 
Court of Appeals, m addressing this very question, stated that 
in order to determine whether evidence of one [count] would 
be admissible at a separate trial on the other count, we 
look to Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. That 
rule provides: ^Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts 
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in or-
der to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, 
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.' 
In the case before the Court, evidence of one count would be ad-
missible at a separate trial on the other count for purposes of 
establishing motive, intent, absence of mistake, etc. There-
fore, the Defendant in this case would not be prejudiced by 
joinder of the various counts since evidence of each count would 
be admissible in a trial on either count. 
Finally, a relevant issue in both counts will be the income 
and expenses of the Defendant during the applicable periods of 
time. Because the time periods for each count overlap substan-
tially, Mr. Horrock's obligations and payments to one former 
spouse would be admissible in establishing the ability to pay 
his obligations to the other former spouse. 
The requirements for joinder are met and there does not ap-
pear to be prejudice to the Defendant. For these reasons, the 
Court hereby denies the Defendant's motion to sever. 
Dated this day of lfyi'%^, , 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
My 
A. LYNN PAYNE, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
